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For many death penalty opponents, death qualification of the capital jury is the
worst part of a broken system.' The United States Supreme Court has accepted, at least
for the sake of argument, the proposition that a death-qualified jury--one consisting
entirely of jurors who state a willingness to apply the death penalty in accordance with
state law2-is more likely to convict a defendant of capital murder than is a non-death-
qualified jury. 3 Yet the Court has also held that a death-qualified jury may
constitutionally determine the defendant's guilt or innocence of capital murder as well
as the defendant's appropriate sentence; any interest the defendant has in a wholly
impartial trial jury is outweighed by the state's efficiency interest in impaneling a
single, death-qualified jury to decide both the defendant's guilt or innocence and his
appropriate punishment.4
The drafting in Massachusetts of a set of best practices for the litigation of capital
cases has occasioned a careful look at the practical questions of conducting capital
trials.5 The goal of the Massachusetts Governor's Council on Capital Punishment was
to help create as nearly perfect a death penalty statute as is possible; to ensure that only
the guilty are convicted of capital murder; and that only the "worst of the worst" are
t Assistant Professor, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver. I would like to thank
Joe Hoffmann for hosting a conference on the Massachusetts death penalty and to the
participants at that conference for helping formulate the thoughts contained herein. Thanks also
to the faculties at the University of San Diego and University of Cincinnati where this paper was
given as a faculty colloquia. Needless to say, all errors or omissions remain those of the authors.
t Associate Professor and Director, Clinical Programs, Suffolk University Law School. I
appreciate the work of Prof. Hoffmann and the entire Massachusetts Governor's Council for
their thoughtful consideration of the serious issues involved in the maintenance of a modern
death penalty scheme. I also wish to thank the Indiana University-Bloomington for the
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1. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 82 (1980); Welsh
S. White, Death-Qualified Juries: The "Prosecution-Proneness" Argument Reexamined, 41 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 353, 406 (1980).
2. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968).
3. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
4. Id. at 178.
5. MASSACHSETSrS GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT,
available at http://www.mass.gov/Agov2/docsl5-3-04%2OMassDPReportFinal.pdf (last visited
December 27, 2004) (reprinted supra at 1) [hereinafter "GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL REPORT"].
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sentenced to death.6 The Council's Report is thus one of a very few attempts to
carefully rethink the way that "death is done" in the United States today.
7
The question of death qualification, however, is not directly addressed in the
Massachusetts Council's Report, and, if anything, the original Report misses an
important opportunity to adopt a new paradigm for determining when and how juries
may be death qualified. At a conference convened at the Indiana University School of
Law in Bloomington, Indiana to discuss and critique the Council's work, this failure to
address death qualification was noted and discussed at some length. In this essay we
build on both the Massachusetts Council's work and the ideas developed at the
conference, using both as a spring-board for the formulation of an appropriate set of
procedures for death qualification in capital trials.8 In particular, we recommend the
following approach to death qualification and bifurcation in a capital trial:
A capital defendant should be given the option of electing to have a
separate jury impaneled for the sentencing phase of the trial, in the event
that the guilt-phase jury convicts him of capital murder. The defendant
should be allowed to exercise this option either prior to the guilt phase of
the trial or after conviction of capital murder. If the defendant makes a
pretrial election to have a separate jury impaneled for sentencing, then the
guilt-phase jury will not be death-qualified. If the defendant decides to
defer the election until after conviction of capital murder, then the guilt-
phase jury will be death-qualified.
We argue in this essay that this approach meets both a state's interest in impaneling
a jury willing to comply with its charge and the defendant's interest in having ajury as
impartial as both practical and possible. While the procedures that we propose might
require a greater expenditure of time and resources than currently-conducted capital
trials, we believe such incremental increase is more than justified by the significant
enhancement in fairness that such a system would provide. In fact, we argue that any
state that takes seriously the goals of creating as fair a death penalty system as possible
ought to include such a plan for true bifurcation and limited death qualification.
This essay proceeds as follows. We begin by summarizing the constitutional law
that governs death qualification of the capital jury. We demonstrate that the Supreme
Court has consistently held both that death qualification of a capital jury is
constitutionally permissible and that the use of a death-qualified jury to determine the
capital defendant's guilt or innocence does not violate any of the Constitution's
provisions. We then review the criticism-both doctrinal and empirical-that these
holdings have received over the years.
6. Id. at 4.
7. The most obvious exception is the Illinois study of the practice of capital punishment.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (April, 2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/comnission-reportlindex.html (last visited December
27, 2004) [hereinafter "ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT"].
8. The suggestion that forms the basis of this essay grew out of free-flowing discussions at
the Indiana conference. It is the product of the careful thought of many of the bright minds at the
conference. We defend it here, but share the credit for its assertion with all of those who
participated in the conference.
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Next, we turn to the work of the Massachusetts Governor's Council, describing its
general approach, its ten recommendations, and in particular, its recommendations on
the bifurcation of the capital trial. What we demonstrate is that while the Council's
work is silent on death qualification, it implicitly endorses the Supreme Court's historic
position that a death-qualified jury may fairly evaluate the defendant's guilt.
Finally, we assess possible solutions to what we identify as the problems with the
Court's current death penalty jurisprudence; that is, we ask how a bifurcated trial could
be organized to avoid the death qualification and forced-choice problems it currently
presents. We conclude that a modification of the Council's report to permit the
defendant to elect to be judged by a non-death-qualified jury on the question of guilt or
innocence would bring the report closer to its goal of stating the best practices for the
imposition of the death penalty in the United States.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND DEATH QUALIFICATION
A. Restricting the States'Exclusion of Jurors
In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Witherspoon v. Illinois.9 The narrow issue
before the Court in that case was whether the Sixth Amendment prohibits the exclusion
of jurors in a death penalty case who have "conscientious scruples against capital
punishment." 10 While Witherspoon primarily urged the Court to hold that the death
qualification process infectedjurors' ability to properly adduce guilt or innocence of a
capital crime, the Court deferred that claim, based in part on a suspicion about the
supporting empirical data."1
Instead, the Court addressed the impact of broad juror exclusion on the likelihood of
a sentence of death. Under the capital sentencing scheme in Witherspoon's case, the
jury was required to decide both guilt and punishment in a unified proceeding.12 This
was a very simple process-if the jury concluded that the defendant was guilty of the
capital crime charged it would then decide, without the benefit of any further
proceeding, whether the defendant should be executed or sentenced to life
imprisonment. 3 The judge at Witherspoon's trial stated early in the voir dire process:
"Let's get these conscientious objectors out of the way without wasting any time on
them.' 14 The state thereafter removed for cause 47 venirepersons because of their
attitudes regarding capital punishment. 15 The resulting jury convicted the defendant
and sentenced him to death.
9. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
10. Id. at 512 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §743 (1959).
11. Id. at 516-518. This issue was ultimately decided adversely to the capital defendant 18
years later in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). See Part I.C., infra.
12. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518.
13. Id. The unified or unitary capital punishment scheme, where guilt and punishment were
decided in the same deliberation, soon became the focus of abolitionist court arguments,
culminating in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (Douglas, J., and Brennan, J.,
dissenting).




In passing on the constitutionality of this process, the Court recognized that
excluding all jurors who merely had "conscientious scruples" against capital
punishment "armed the prosecution with unlimited challenges for cause,"' 6 and
"produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die."' 7 Therefore, the
Court held, the practice of death qualification ofjuries based on conscientious scruples
is a violation of the Sixth Amendment.' 8 In so finding, the Court created a broad
standard applicable to the qualification of jurors in all death penalty states: all that
could constitutionally be required of jurors was a willingness "to consider all the
penalties provided by state law."' 9 If a state allowed the exclusion of jurors "on any
broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot be carried out .... ,,20 The decision
was specifically limited in its reach to capital sentencing and thus did not impact the
defendant's conviction of capital murder.2' The Court further limited its decision's
application by stating that its decision did not "affect the validity of any sentence other
than death.,
22
The impact of this decision on the then-extant death penalty system across the
country cannot be underestimated. In light of Witherspoon, in both state and federal
courts reviewing state convictions, thousands of inmates sought relief on grounds of
improper juror exclusion.23
16. Id. at 512.
17. Id. at 521 (note omitted).
18. Id. at 518 ("[I]t is self-evident that, in its role as arbiter of the punishment to be
imposed, this jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which petitioner was entitled under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
19. Id. at 522, n.21.
20. Id. In the now-famous footnote 21 of Witherspoon, the Court created astringent test for
federal review of claims of improper juror removal. The Court stated that veniremen excluded
for cause could only be those
who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the
imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be
developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the
death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the
defendant's guilt.
Id. (emphasis in original).
21. Id.
22. Id. This construction prefigures the jurisprudence of heightened reliability that is now a
recognized aspect of the modem death penalty. See e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
23. Anthony Amsterdam, In Favorum Mortis: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment,
14 HuM. RTS. 14, 49 (1987). Amsterdam estimates the number of death sentence reversals on
Witherspoon grounds between twelve and thirteen hundred cases. Id. Witherspoon was fully
retroactive to cases that were already in federal habeas corpus proceedings because of the
Court's holding that "a death sentence cannot be carried out" if ajury was thus composed. This
retroactivity determination applied to the punishment might have a very different outcome
today. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity is threshold issue that bars federal
postconviction relief based on "new rules" except in narrowly excepted situations)
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B. The Effect of Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia
Witherspoon was an important part of a broad attack on the death penalty that took
place in the federal courts in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This attack led to a de
facto execution moratorium in the states2 4 and culminated in the Supreme Court's 1972
decision in Furman v. Georgia,25 that the death penalty, as it was then being
conducted, violated the Constitution. The nine members of the Court generated ten
opinions in Furman; two of the justices believed that the death penalty was cruel and
unusual punishment in all cases, three justices held that the discretionary nature of the
Georgia sentencing regime at issue violated defendants' rights, and four justices would
have upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia regime.
If Witherspoon's impact was broad, Furman's was epochal. It had the effect of
emptying the nation's death rows, and sending the state legislatures back to their
respective drawing boards. Throughout the land, legislators parsed the Court's various
opinions in Furman and wrote statutes attempting to comply with the Court's
ambiguous mandate in that case. These new capital statutes were tested for the first
time four years later when the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the new Georgia
statute as well as to the statutes passed in North Carolina, 26 Florida,27 Louisiana 28 and
Texas. 29 The Supreme Court upheld the Georgia statute, essentially holding it out as a
model to the states.
30
In upholding the Georgia statute, the Court praised a number of the procedural
safeguards that had been added to the process of capital adjudication: the direct and
automatic appeal provided for, the instructions to guide juror discretion, and the
bifurcation of the capital trial into a guilt-innocence phase and a sentencing phase. As a
result of the decisions in Gregg and its companions, the Georgia factors were soon
adopted nationwide, becoming something of a gold standard for the conducting of
criminal trials. As we shall see in the next section, the wide-spread adoption of these
procedural safeguards had enormous implications for the question of death
qualification.
C. Death Qualification Redux
Having endorsed both the move from the unitary trial to the bifurcated trial and the
required restraints on the discretion of capital jurors, the Supreme Court returned to the
question of death qualification in Wainwright v. Witt,3 1 ostensibly to decide what effect
these changes in the structure of the capital trial had on the doctrine first announced in
Witherspoon. Witherspoon, decided eight years earlier, and by a very different
Supreme Court, had held the states to a very strict standard of proof before ajuror with
scruples against the death penalty could constitutionally be removed for cause. After
24. Franklin E. Zimring, THECONTRADICTIONS OFAMERICAN CAPrrALPUNISHMENT (2003).
25. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
26. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
27. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)
28. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)
29. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
30. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
31. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
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the death penalty had been reinstated in Gregg, attorneys for condemned inmates
continued to use the Witherspoon standard to seek and secure reversals of their
convictions in federal courts via habeas petitions, notwithstanding the fundamental
changes in the way capital cases were now being tried.32
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Witt majority, began by limiting the Witherspoon
case to its facts33 and reducing its most important holding to dicta.34 Relying on a cut
and paste analysis of Lockett v. Ohio35 and Adams v. Texas,36 the majority found that
"[t]he state of this case law leaves trial courts with the difficult task of distinguishing
between prospective jurors whose opposition to capital punishment will not allow them
to apply the law or view the facts impartially and jurors who, though opposed to capital
32. See, e.g., id. at 415-416. After Witt was tried for capital murder, convicted, and
sentenced to die, the litigation of his Witherspoon claim began:
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court respondent raised a number of claims,
one of which was that several prospective jurors had been improperly excluded for
cause because of their opposition to capital punishment, in violation of this
Court's decision in Witherspoon.... The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction and sentence, and this Court denied certiorari. Witt v. State, 342 So.2d
497 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977). After unsuccessfully
petitioning for postconviction review in the state courts... respondent filed this
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, raising numerous constitutional claims. That court
denied the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed and granted the writ [on Witherspoon grounds]. [Witt v. Wainwright,]
714 F.2d 1069 (1 1th Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 769 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 415. As evidenced by the proceedings in Witt's case, it was a federal court that finally
vindicated his meritorious Witherspoon claim.
33. Id. at 418. See, generally, Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty
and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1741, 1746-50 (1987). Witherspoon was a case born of
an era where federal constitutional concerns outweighed the courts seeming preference for
procedural barriers to review.
34. Witt, 469 U.S. at 422 ("[T]he statements in the Witherspoon footnotes are in any event
dicta. The Court's holding focused only on circumstances under which prospectivejurors could
not be excluded; under Witherspoon's facts it was unnecessary to decide when they could be.")
(emphasis in original). But see, id. at 439,455 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he label 'dictum'
does not begin to convey the status that the restrictions embodied in footnote 21 [of
Witherspoon] have achieved in this Court and state and federal courts over the last decade and a
half.").
35. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). In Lockett, the Court found that jurors were properly excluded
when they made it unmistakably clear that their scruples against the death penalty prevented
them from abiding by existing law and following the instructions of the trial judge. Id. at 596.
The Court in Lockett also unmistakably adopted the standard of Witherspoon's footnote 21. Id.
36. 448 U.S. 38 (1980). In Adams, the Court reversed the sentence of the petitioner because
jurors had been excluded on the basis of their refusal to take an oath which required them, inter
alia, to promise that the mandatory penalty of death would not affect his deliberations. Id. at 42.
As in Lockett, the Court favorably relied on Witherspoon footnote 21. Id. at 44. The Court held
that "ajuror cannot be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless
those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath." Id. at 45.
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punishment, will nevertheless conscientiously apply the law to the facts adduced at
trial. 3 7
To ease the courts in this difficult task, the Court adopted the language of Adams as
the new standard for analyzing juror exclusion claims:
Although this task may be difficult in any event, it is obviously made more
difficult by the fact that the standard applied in Adams differs markedly
from the language of footnote 21. The tests with respect to sentencing and
guilt, originally in two prongs, have merged; the requirement that a juror
may be excluded only if he would never vote for the death penalty is now
missing; gone too is the extremely high burden of proof. In general, the
standard has been simplified.38
The more disturbing aspect of Witt for death-sentenced habeas petitioners was the
majority's decision to put the entire issue into the hands of the state trial judge, thus
"de-regulating" the federal control over this aspect of death penalty administration.
39
The Court relied on Patton v. Yount, 4 0 decided only a year earlier, which bad held a
trial judge's findings, regarding the exclusion for cause of a juror on grounds of bias,
were findings of fact requiring federal court deference under §2254(d).' The Court
then determined that the "simplified" version of capital trial juror exclusion was no
42different than the determination of bias. From there, the Court took the quick step that
all but precluded federal review ofjuror exclusion claims:
Once it is recognized that excluding prospective capital sentencing jurors
because of their opposition to capital punishment is no different from
excluding jurors for innumerable other reasons which result in bias, Patton
must control. The trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal
standard to what he sees and hears, but his predominant function in
determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be
easily discerned from an appellate record. These are "factual issues" that
are subject to §2254(d).43
The effect of this holding was that state trial judges' decisions regarding a juror's
willingness to impose the death penalty could be overturned by a federal court only if
the trial judge's opinion was "clearly erroneous."
37. Witt, 469 U.S. at 421.
38. Id. at 421.
39. See Burt, supra note 33 at 1785; see also generally, Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 305 (1984).
40. 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
41. Id. at 1038.




The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, assailed the Court on both of these points.
44
One of only three remaining members of the Witherspoon Court,45 Justice Brennan
once again urged upon the Court the Sixth Amendment basis for that decision. 46 The
Witherspoon Court had considered the constitutional interests of the defendant who
faced the death penalty superior to the interests of the State that sought his death.47
This weighted balancing led the Court to require "the State to make an exceptionally
strong showing that a prospective juror's views about the death penalty will result in
actual bias toward the defendant before permitting exclusion of the juror for cause."'
4
This strict standard prevented the State from stacking a jury with those inclined to
impose death and creating a panel that was "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to
die.
, 49
The Witherspoon standard was thus not merely a product of offhand dicta, as
suggested by the majority, but was a reasoned attempt to standardize and make
rationally reviewable the states' death qualification practices. Justice Brennan saw the
44. Id. at 439 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also took issue with the Court's wholly
irrelevant discussion of the facts of the underlying capital murder:
The Court has depicted the lurid details of respondent Witt's crime with the
careful skill of a pointillist. Had the Court been equally diligent in rendering the
holding below, it might not have neglected to mention that, as in every case of a
violation of Witherspoon,... only the defendant's death sentence and not his
conviction was vacated. However heinous Witt's crime, the majority's vivid
portrait of its gruesome details has no bearing on the issue before us. It is not for
this Court to decide whether Witt deserves to die. That decision must first be made
by a jury of his peers, so long as the jury is impartial and drawn from a fair cross
section of the community in conformity with the requirements of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 440 n.1.
45. The other two were Justices Marshall and White.
46. Id. at 439.
47. Id. at 444--45:
[U]ntil today-we viewed the risks to a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights from
ajury from which those who oppose capital punishment have been excluded as far
more serious than the risk to the State from inclusion of particular jurors whose
views about the death penalty might turn out to predispose them toward the
defendant, we placed on the State an extremely high burden to justify exclusion.
48. Id. at 439; see also id. at 443-44:
Three important consequences flow from Witherspoon's stringent standard for
exclusion. First, it permits exclusion only of jurors whose views would prevent or
substantially impair them from following instructions or abiding by an oath, and
not those whose views would simply make these tasks more psychologically or
emotionally difficult .... Second, it precludes exclusion of jurors whose voir dire
responses to death-qualification inquiries are ambiguous or vacillating .... Third,
it precludes exclusion of jurors who do not know at voir dire whether their views
about the death penalty will prevent them abiding by their oaths at the trial.
49. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521. See also, Witt, 469 U.S. at 446 ("We have repeatedly
stressed that the essence of Witherspoon is its requirement that only jurors who make it
unmistakably clear that their views about capital punishment would prevent or substantially
impair them from following the law may be excluded.") (citing Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S.
262 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969)).
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Court's decision in Wit fnot as the "simplification" it disingenuously proclaimed itself
to be, 50 but as a well planned move to end federal review of the death qualified juror
exclusion claims:
The crucial departure is the decision to discard Witherspoon's stringent
standard of proof. The Court no longer prohibits exclusion of uncertain,
vacillating, or ambiguous prospective jurors. It no longer requires an
unmistakably clear showing that a prospective juror will be prevented or
substantially impaired from following instructions and abiding by an oath.
Instead, the trial judge at voir dire is instructed to evaluate juror
uncertainty, ambiguity, or vacillation to decide whether the juror's views
about capital punishment "might frustrate administration of a State's death
penalty scheme."
5'
Only after the majority had altered the Witherspoon standard for death qualification
was it possible to describe death qualification determinations as "factual issues" and
not legal conclusions. 52 This change in the way death qualification was conceived
virtually eliminated federal review of death qualification claims and largely exempted
capital jury selection from rational federal review.
53
50. Justice Brennan commented on the inability to rationally review any determinations of
trial judges in these circumstances because of their completely subjective nature:
[T]he Court goes on to ascribe to the trial judge the power to divine through
demeanor alone which of such jurors "would be unable to faithfully and
impartially apply the law,"... and requires deference to the trial-court decisions
to exclude for this reason. Not surprisingly, the Court provides no support for the
rather remarkable assertion that a judge will, despite ambiguity in a juror's
response, be able to perceive ajuror's inability to follow the law and abide by an
oath when the juror himself or herself does not yet know how he or she will react
to the case at hand.
Id. at 453 n. 9 (quoting id. at 426).
51. Id. at 452 (quoting id. at 416) (emphasis in the original). Justice Brennan exposed this
departure as the means to the true ends of the Court-bringing questions of juror qualification
within the "factual issue" limitation on federal habeas corpus jurisdiction:
[The Court's] discussion of the proper standard of review of state-court
Witherspoon determinations cannot pass without some comment. One evident
purpose of the Court's redefinition of the standards governing death-qualification
is to bring review of death-qualification questions within the scope of the
presumption of correctness of state-court factual findings on federal collateral
review.
Had the Court maintained Witherspoon's strict standards for death-qualification,
there would be no question that trial-court decisions to exclude scrupled jurors
would not be questions of fact subject to the presumption of correctness. Whether
a prospective juror with qualms about the death penalty expressed an inability to
abide by an oath with sufficient strength and clarity to justify exclusion is certainly
a "mixed question"-an application of a legal standard to undisputed historical
fact.
Id. at 461--62
52. Id. at 462.
53. Since Witt, there have been no federal cases finally overturning a death sentence based
2005]
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Once again, the Court avoided answering the difficult question of the effect that
death qualification had on the adjudication of guilt of a capital offense. The Court
would dispose of that remaining issue the very next term in Lockhart v. McCree.54 The
petitioner in the case, Adria McCree, was tried in Arkansas for capital felony murder.
Before the trial began, eight potential jurors were removed for cause because they
stated during voir dire that they could not vote for a penalty of death. The resulting,
death-qualified jury found the defendant guilty of capital murder and then fixed the
appropriate punishment as life imprisonment. 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to answer the question it had reserved in both Witherspoon and Witt: Whether a death-
qualified jury is unconstitutionally predisposed to convict a defendant of a capital
crime.
6
To support his claim, McCree relied on several empirical studies that suggested that
a death-qualified jury was unconstitutionally organized not only for death, but for guilt
as well. 7 The lower courts had reviewed these studies and held that McCree had met
his burden of demonstrating that death qualification unconstitutionally tainted the jury
in the guilt/innocence phase of the triali 8 The Supreme Court accepted the premises of
the lower court's evidentiary conclusions, but only after savaging that same evidence.
The Court started by pointing out what it believed "to be several serious flaw's in the
evidence upon which the courts below reached the conclusion that 'death qualification'
on a state trial court's erroneous determination that a specific juror was excludable for cause
under the majority standard. The continuing assault on the federal review of claims raised by
state inmates, particularly those under sentence of death, spurred Justice Brennan in his dissent
in Witt to identify three continuing themes in the majority's constitutional criminal law
jurisprudence:
Today's opinion for the Court is the product of a saddening confluence of three of
the most disturbing trends in our constitutional jurisprudence respecting the
fundamental rights of our people. The first is the Court's unseemly eagerness to
recognize the strength of the State's interest in efficient law enforcement and to
make expedient sacrifices of the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant to
such interests. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,929-30 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The second is the Court's increasing disaffection with the previously
unquestioned principle, endorsed by every member of this Court, that "because of
its severity and irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any
other punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards .... "
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) [further citations omitted]. The third is the Court's increasingly
expansive definition of "questions of fact" calling for application of the
presumption of correctness of 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) to thwart vindication of
fundamental rights in the federal courts.
Id. at 462-63. These themes have continued to predominate Supreme Court jurisprudence for
the past twenty years.
54. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
55. Id. at 166.
56. The question addressed by the Court was: "Does the Constitution prohibit the removal
for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors whose
opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair the
performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial?" Id. at 165.
57. Id. at 168-70 (listing and describing studies).
58. Id. at 167-68.
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provides conviction prone juries."5 9 Regarding the studies that bolstered McCree's
case and that were also part of the Witherspoon litigation, the Court found that "[i]t
goes almost without saying that if these studies were 'too tentative and fragmentary' to
make out a claim of constitutional error in 1968, the same studies, unchanged but for
having aged some 18 years, are still insufficient to make out such a claim in this
case." 60 As for the remaining studies, the Court quibbled with individual aspects of
some and decided the remaining few were too isolated to entitle the petitioner to
relief.6' After this dissection, however, the Court continued to the legal issue:
[W]e will assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are both
methodologically valid and adequate to establish that "death qualification"
in fact produces juries somewhat more "conviction prone" than "non-
death-qualified" juries. We hold nonetheless, that the Constitution does
not prohibit the States from "death qualifying" juries in capital cases.
62
The Court examined two separate Sixth Amendment arguments presented by
McCree, rejecting each in turn. First, the Court rejected the argument that death
qualifying guilt-phase jurors violated the fair cross-section requirements of the Sixth
Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.6 3 The fair cross-section
protection requires that the process for choosing the venire-the larger pool from
whom the ultimate jury is chosen---does not systematically exclude any "'distinctive'
group in the community." 4 While the Court noted that it had previously held blacks, 65
women,66 and Mexican-Americans 67 to be distinctive groups worthy of constitutional
protection from exclusion, the group of potential jurors who could be excluded under
Witherspoon differed "significantly from the groups ... previously recognized as
'distinctive.' 68 The Court held that exclusion of jurors who could not vote for death
was "carefully designed to serve the State's concededly legitimate interest in obtaining
a single jury that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at
both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial. ' '69
McCree also urged the Court to rule that a jury predisposed to convict was also a
violation of the impartiality requirements of the Sixth Amendment. 70 The Court
rejected this claim as well, primarily because McCree could only argue that it was the
59. Id. at 168 (note omitted)
60. Id. at 171.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 173.
63. Id. at 174.
64. Id. at 175 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).
65. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
66. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
67. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1975).
68. McCree, 476 U.S. at 175.
69. Id. at 175-76. The Court also noted that McCree did not argue that "'death
qualification' was instituted as a means for the State to arbitrarily skew the composition of
capital case juries." Id. at 176 (note omitted). However, it is likely that many jurisdictions
maintain such practice specifically for that purpose.
70. Id. at 177. This claim has traditionally been applied when it demonstrated that a
particular juror has been influenced or biased by extra-trial information.
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jury as a whole that was skewed and could point to no single juror who was actually
biased toward guilt.71 Just as in the analysis of the fair cross-section claim, the Court
relied for its conclusion on the "State's entirely proper interest in obtaining a single
jury that could impartially decide all of the issues in McCree's case."
72
The Court thus decided that even though death qualification is presumed to create a
risk of generating a conviction-prone jury, that risk was outweighed by the state's two
stated interests. 73 The first of these was a state's interest in judicial administrative
economy. Under this rationale, the Court reasoned:
[I]t seems obvious to us that in most, if not all, capital cases much of the
evidence adduced at the guilt phase of the trial will also have a bearing on
the penalty phase; if two different juries were to be required, such
evidence would have to be presented twice, once to each jury. 74
The second stated rationale accepted by the Court was the paternalistic idea that
single juries in capital cases actually benefit defendants because of the opportunity they
provide for a single jury to consider "residual doubt" in the punishment phase of the
trial.75 The Court concluded that these two rationales were "sufficient to negate the
inference ... concerning the lack of any neutral justification" to support the State's
maintenance of the single jury procedure in the face of the risk of guilt-verdict bias.76
Together with Win, McCree placed a capital defendant in great peril.. Taken
together, these decisions made it easier for the state to deathqualify a capital trial and
upheld the notion that a single, death-qualified jury could judge both the defendant's
appropriate punishment and the question of guilt or innocence.
77
71. Id. at 177-78. The Court noted that it had "consistently rejected this view of jury
impartiality" and had recently "held that an impartial jury consists of nothing more than 'jurors
who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts."' Id. at 178 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 423).
72. id. at 180.
73. This risk-based constitutional analysis is a precursor of the analysis used by the Court in
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McClesky, the Court rejected a challenge to the
imposition of his death sentence on the basis that the death penalty was applied in a
discriminatory manner. As in McCree, the Supreme Court presumed that the proffered statistical
evidence proved what it purported to, but nonetheless held that the defendant had failed to make
out a constitutional violation.
74. McCree, 476 U.S. at 181.
75. Id. ("Another interest identified by the State in support of its system of unitary juries is
the possibility that, in at least some capital cases, the defendant might benefit at the sentencing
phase of the trial from the jury's 'residual doubts' about the evidence presented at the guilt
phase."). As the dissent pointed out, the state is an odd advocate for the interests of capital
defendants. Below, we return to the question of residual doubts, concluding that they may well
be an important consideration, but one that defendants ought to be able to consider on their
own.
76. Id. at 182.
77. In 1992, the United States Supreme Court, in a "goose and gander" case, resolved the
question of what should be the appropriate constitutional treatment of jurors who stated they
would ignore mitigating evidence and vote for death if the defendant were found guilty of the
crime. In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), such jurors are referred to as "reverse
Witherspoon" jurors. In Morgan's trial, seventeen potential jurors were removed under Witt's
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II. THE MASSACHUSETTS PROPOSAL
A. Overview
In September 2003, newly elected Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney convened
a blue ribbon panel to draft a set of best practices for the application of a new death
penalty in his state. 78 At the time of Romney's initiative, Massachusetts had been
without a valid death penalty statute since the Supreme Judicial Court struck down the
prior statute in 198479 and had gone more than fifty years without an execution.80
substantial effects test. Id. at 722-23. However, the trial court refused to ask a potential juror
Morgan's proposed inquiry: "If you found Derrick Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote
to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are?" Id. at 723.
Justice White, writing for the majority, first held that the Sixth Amendment's Impartial Jury
Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmeni require juror impartiality at
sentencing in a capital case. Id. at 726-27. As the Court held, "[a] juror who will automatically
vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do so." Id. at 729.
The Court also held that, if requested, a trial court must inquire into prospective jurors'
views about consideration of mitigation evidence. Ajuror's failure to even consider mitigating
evidence, as expressed by a predetermined plan to automatically vote for death after conviction,
violated the law which requires that jurors consider all the evidence, including mitigating
evidence. Id. at 732-33; see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion) (jurors may not
"be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death") (emphasis in original); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987).
The Court ultimately held that the trial court's failure to specifically inquire regarding
"reverse Witherspoon" jurors rendered the trial unfair:
Were voir dire not available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner's challenge for
cause against those perspective jurors who would always impose death following
conviction, his right not to be tried by such jurors would be rendered as nugatory
and meaningless as the State's right, in absence of questioning, to strike those who
would never do so.
Id. at 733-734 (emphasis in original).
Although Morgan balanced the procedures for juror exclusion between defense and
prosecution, the practical effect has been small. Absent a complete refusal by the trial court to
inquire ofjurors whether they would automatically vote for death, reversals based on Morgan
are nearly non-existent. This is because the answers of prospective jurors, once inquiry is made,
are treated under the Witt standard-as facts that the trial court determines which are practically
unreviewable. Therefore, in many cases, close-call Witherspoon excludables are removed from
the jury while close-call Morgan excludables are allowed to remain. These practically
unreviewable decisions further lean capital juries toward conviction and decisions in favor of
death.
78. GOVENOR'S COUNCtL REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. The Council's report is not
technically a death penalty statute. It is written as an incomplete set of suggestions rather than a
complete, internally consistent set of rules that could be used to run a capital trial. The process
of incorporating these recommendations into a statute continues at the time of this writing.
79. Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984)
80. The last execution in Massachusetts occurred in 1947. See Facts about the Death




Romney, a Republican who had won election in a traditionally Democratic state, saw
the appointment of the Governor's Council as an important step in meeting his
campaign promise of returning the death penalty to Massachusetts.
Massachusetts was, of course, not alone in the early years of this millennium in
impaneling a commission to study the practice of the death penalty. However, it
approached the question from a very different historical place than did many of the
other states involved in careful death penalty study. For example, Illinois has been a
death penalty state for decades and has executed twelve people since the reinstitution
of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia in 1976.81 Illinois had also, quite famously,
been forced to release thirteen condemned inmates from its death row when evidence
of their innocence was brought to light.8 2 Illinois's Governor George Ryan responded
to these developments by imposing an execution moratorium in his state and
appointing a commission to look into the problems with the system as it then existed.8
3
The commission made more than 100 recommendations for the improvement of
Illinois's capital system 84 and Governor Ryan, on leaving office in early 2003,
pardoned or commuted the sentence of each of the more than 160 men on Illinois's
death row.
85
The Massachusetts project, therefore, is very different from those ongoing in Illinois
and other current death penalty states. While those states have been attempting to
rescue their current death penalty practices from the taint of the condemnation of the
innocent or the undeserving, the Massachusetts project aims to add Massachusetts to
the list of 38 states and the federal system which currently permit the imposition of the
death penalty for certain homicides. In this sense, the Massachusetts project flies in the
face of what has seemed, to some, like a slow march away from the widespread
acceptance of the death penalty.
8 6
Mindful of the national mood of increased skepticism regarding the death penalty
schemes that produced such flawed results, Governor Romney's charge to the Council
was to produce a death penalty statute that would, to the extent possible, ensure that
only the guilty are convicted of capital crimes and that only the "worst of the worst"
are sentenced to death.8 7 Romney made clear to the Council that he was more
concerned with procedural regularity than with a statute of broad practical application;
he therefore instructed the Council that its work would be welcomed even if it led to a
system under which only a handful of offenders are ever sentenced to death.8
81. See Governor George Ryan's Commutation Announcement, January 11, 2003,
available at http://www.law.northwestem.eduldepts/clinic/wrongfullRyanSpeech.htm. (last
visited December 28, 2004) [hereinafter "Ryan Commutation Announcement"].
82. Id.
83. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
84. Id.
85. See Ryan Commutation Announcement, supra note 81.
86. See Franklin E. Zimring, Symbol and Substance in the Massachusetts Commission
Report, supra Plenary Address at 115 (citing SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTiCE STATsTnCS
2002, at Table 6.76 (showing a drop in executions nationwide from a high of 98 in 1999)).
87. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
88. Conversation at Symposium with William J. Meade, Deputy Chief Legal Counsel,
Office of the Governor of Massachusetts (September 10, 2004).
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After several months of investigation, conferring and drafting, the Council came up
with ten recommendations addressing what the Council saw as the greatest
impediments to the just imposition of the death penalty in the United States. Upon the
release of the Council's report, Governor Romney stated that he was sufficiently
confident of the safeguards recommended that he would bet his own life on the
reliability of the proposed system. The Governor's office is in the process of studying
the Council's recommendations, and has given assurances that it will incorporate each
of these recommendations into a bill that will ultimately be sent to the state
legislature.
8 9
Several of the Council's proposals have received widespread press attention and
positive support from academics and practitioners. For example, the sixth proposal,
likely to be the most controversial of the Council's recommendations, states that a
capital defendant may not be sentenced to death in the absence of physical evidence
that strongly corroborates the defendant's guilt.90 Other provisions establish a narrow
list of death eligibility factors, guidelines for the application of prosecutorial discretion
at the sentencing phase, guidelines for the qualification of capital defense counsel, new
procedures for the bifurcation of the capital trial, special jury instructions on the
fallibility of human evidence, a requirement of scientific evidence to corroborate the
defendant's guilt, a heightened burden of proof at the sentencing phase, the grant of
authority to trial and appellate courts to set aside any death verdict, and the creation of
a permanent commission to review claims of innocence or error.
9
1
B. Bifurcation and the Failure to Address Death Qualification
It is the fourth of these recommendations to which this essay is most closely
addressed. That recommendation reads in full:
At the end of the guilt-innocence stage of the capital trial, if the defendant
is convicted of capital murder, the defendant should have the right to
request the selection of a new jury for the sentencing stage. If the
defendant exercises this right, then the defendant should be deemed to
have waived the issue of residual or lingering doubt about guilt, and
should not be allowed to raise such an issue during the sentencing stage.
At the start of the sentencing stage, if a jury has been selected, the
prosecution shall be permitted to present otherwise admissible evidence to
the new jury to the extent reasonably necessary to inform the new jury
about the nature and circumstances of the crime, including each of the
elements... that were found by the original jury at the guilt-innocence
stage, and to allow the new jury to determine the appropriate weight to be
given to these facts in deciding the sentence. The new jury shall be
instructed that each of the elements that were found by the original jury at
the guilt-innocence stage shall be deemed established beyond a reasonable
doubt for purposes of the sentencing stage, but that any additional facts
elicited by the prosecution at the sentencing stage that are not essential to
the verdict of guilty of capital murder shall not be deemed established
89. Id.
90. GOvERNOR'S COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 5, at 20-21.
91. Id. at 5.
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beyond a reasonable doubt. The new jury should not be told whether the
defendant contested his guilt during the guilt-innocence stage.
92
In essence, the Massachusetts report allows a defendant to make a strategic choice
in the event that he is convicted of capital murder. He may choose to have a single jury
consider the questions of guilt or innocence and punishment, retaining the guilt-phase
jury after conviction in the hopes that he can argue to them the question of residual
doubts remaining from their guilty verdict. Alternatively, a defendant convicted of a
capital crime may choose, having determined from the guilt-phase that the jury's
sympathies are not with him, to have a separate jury impaneled to determine the
appropriate punishment in his case.
C. Critique of the Massachusetts Approach
Without question, the Massachusetts proposal is an improvement over current
practice in the states. Today, no state's capital statutory scheme contemplates the
impaneling of separate juries to determine guilt or innocence and penalty in the
original prosecution of a capital defendant. 93 Though there have been calls for exactly
this sort of true bifurcation virtually since the time of Gregg,94 no state has yet put such
a plan in place. The primary stated reason, of course, is usually expense.95 The
Massachusetts proposal raises the specter of death qualifying two juries in the event
that the defendant elects to have a second jury consider the question of punishment.
Given the difficulties, costs, and time associated with impaneling a single capital jury,
it is not surprising that states uniformly employ a single jury to sit and act during both
phases.
From the defense perspective the advantages of the proposed Massachusetts system
are apparent. The reliance by the Supreme Court on bifurcation as a restraint on
92. Id. at 17-18.
93. The authors can discover no statute which explicitly authorizes, let alone requires, two
separate juries for the separate phases of an initial capital trial. This may indeed reflect the
shared understanding of the executive branch, the legislature, and the United States Supreme
Court that death qualification of a jury favors the state at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial.
All states, however, allow a separate jury to be empanelled if a case is overturned on appeal on
sentencing error alone. Therefore, it cannot be said that states actually oppose separate juries for
sentencing for such a policy would require complete new trials-both guilt-innocence and
punishment phases-for reversals based on error at any point in the proceeding. What can be
concluded, ultimately, is that states do not oppose separate trials when that procedural
expedience benefits the state.
94. See, e.g., Maury Albon Hubbard III, Note, Lockhart v. McCree: Death Qualification of
Jury Prior to Guilt Phase of Bifurcated Capital Trial Held Constitutional, 66 N.C. L. REv. 183,
197 (1987) (arguing that death qualification makes ajury so conviction-prone that it may induce
prosecutors to seek the death penalty in cases they would otherwise not.); Claudia L. Cowan et
al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors'Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality
of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEtAV. (1984) (describing the ways in which death
qualification makes jurors more prone to convict).
95. We say "stated" reason because we believe that the conviction-prone nature of the death
qualified capital jury is a strong incentive for the use of a single jury. See Hubbard, supra note
94.
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arbitrariness 96 has largely been misplaced. While the temporal distancing of the guilt
and punishment determinations at the bifurcated trial relieves some of the pressure on a
defendant to choose between contesting either his guilt or his death-worthiness, it
certainly does not remove such pressures. A defendant who knows that his mitigation
case will be based primarily upon acceptance of responsibility and remorse, for
example, may feel great pressure not to vigorously test the state's murder case for fear
that this will prejudice his capacity to assert his sincere remorse at the penalty phase.
Similarly, a defendant who has made a vigorous assertion of his innocence at the guilt
phase may now feel that the assertion of remorse and responsibility at the penalty phase
will only anger jurors who have heard him argue his non-involvement at the earlier
stage. The existence of a single jury to resolve both questions in a capital trial makes
largely illusory any strategic choices that bifurcation might seem to offer.
Such Hobson's choices are all but eliminated by the Massachusetts proposal. For
example, if a defendant wishes to, he may take the stand at his murder trial and claim
mistaken identity, minimal participation, or any other defense to a capital murder
charge. If he is unsuccessful in convincing a jury that he did not commit the murder or
did not participate to the extent alleged, he may either proceed with that same jury to
the penalty phase or may choose to have another impaneled in its place. If he elects to
proceed before a second jury, such ajury would be untainted by his previous assertion
of innocence and thus, at least theoretically, would be more inclined to take seriously a
mitigation case based on acceptance of responsibility and remorse. Conversely the
defendant might conclude that, having established the possibility of actual innocence in
the jury's mind, it would make sense to proceed to sentencing with the same jury and to
make out a mitigation case based in part upon those lingering doubts.
This choice would be made by the defendant himself, in consultation with his
counsel, rather than paternalistically by a court that presumes that a defendant would
be prejudiced rather than helped by the impaneling of a second jury.97 As we discuss
below, different factual situations might counsel for or against the impaneling of a
second jury in any particular case in ways that will often not be foreseeable beforehand
or to outside observers. In this context, the authority to determine which strategy is
most advantageous can only sensibly be vested in the defendant and his counsel.
In these important ways, therefore, the Massachusetts statute is a significant
improvement over current practice. Our critique of the proposal, in fact, is that it fails
to go far enough. Principally, we would have it address a question on which it is
entirely silent-that of death qualification. As we discuss in the next section, we
believe that the provision of a truly bifurcated trial would undo the damage created by
Lockhart v. McCree and thus greatly increase the fairness of the capital trial.
96. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1976) (arguing that bifurcation is
"more likely" to limit arbitrary results than is a unitary capital system).
97. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181 (1986) ("Another interest identified by the
State in support of its system of unitary juries is the possibility that, in at least some capital
cases, the defendant might benefit at the sentencing phase of the trial from the jury's 'residual




For nearly as long as death qualification has been used, it has been criticized. Even
before the Supreme Court endorsed the practice in Witherspoon, commentators had
noted what is lost when those with scruples against the imposition of the death penalty
are excluded from service on the capital jury. In this section we discuss some of the
alternatives to the current practice of death qualification that have arisen, concluding
ultimately that none strikes the balance between fairness and efficiency as well as our
proposed modification of the Massachusetts recommendation.
1. No death qualification (the Douglas approach)
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, Justice William 0. Douglas concurred in the Court's
judgment that those who express scruples against the imposition of the death penalty
may not be removed from service on a capital jury for that reason alone. However,
Justice Douglas would have had the Court go much further, and would have precluded
death qualification entirely:
A fair cross-section of the community may produce ajury almost certain to
impose the death penalty if guilt were found; or it may produce a jury
almost certain not to impose it. The conscience of the community is
subject to many variables, one of which is the attitude toward the death
sentence. If a particular community were overwhelmingly opposed to
capital punishment, it would not be able to exercise a discretion to impose
or not impose the death sentence. A jury representing the conscience of
that community would do one of several things depending on the type of
state law governing it: it would avoid the death penalty by recommending
mercy or it would avoid it by finding guilt of a lesser offense. In such
instance, why should not an accused have the benefit of that controlling
principle of mercy in the community? Why should his fate be entrusted
exclusively to a jury that was either enthusiastic about capital punishment
or so undecided that it could exercise a discretion to impose it or not,
depending on how it felt about the particular case?
I see no constitutional basis for excluding those who are so opposed to
capital punishment that they would never inflict it on a defendant.
Exclusion of them means the selection of jurors who are either
protagonists of the death penalty or neutral concerning it. That results in a
systematic exclusion of qualified groups, and the deprivation to the
accused of a cross-section of the community for decision on both his guilt
and his punishment.
98
For Douglas, then, the petit jury that is actually impaneled in a capital case ought to
represent the fullness of views on capital punishment shared by the citizenry, even if
those views would preclude some jurors from imposing the death penalty under any
circumstances. Implicit in the process of trial by jury, he seems to argue, is the
possibility that those with extreme views will be impaneled to judge or sentence their
peers.
98. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 528 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
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The problem with Douglas's view, in our opinion, is that it is inconsistent with the
concept that all jurors must be willing and able to fulfill their legal duties as jurors.99 If
state law requires the jurors to deliberate on the defendant's aggravating and mitigating
factors in order to determine whether the appropriate punishment is life imprisonment
or death, a juror who will not engage in that process should be excluded for the same
reason that a juror who will not deliberate on any other basis should be excluded.
Certainly, those opposed to death qualification would admit that a venireperson who
stated that she could not fairly judge the defendant's guilt should be excluded from
service. Why then, should the defendant benefit from the service of a juror who has
made clear her unwillingness to consider his moral culpability according to the
procedures laid out by state law?'t°
2. Two Juries
Another possible solution is the impaneling of two juries, one death qualified, one
not, in each capital case. Both juries would hear the guilt testimony, and the non-death-
qualified jury would determine the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence of
capital murder. In the event that the guilt jury convicts the defendant of a capital crime,
the death-qualified jury would be seated to determine penalty and the guilt jury will be
excused. In the event that the guilt jury acquits of the capital count(s), the death-
qualified jury will be excused without being needed.
The use of two juries in a single criminal trial is not unheard of and arises
principally in the case of multiple defendants tried together. In such circumstances,
some evidence is admissible against all of the defendants, some against a subset of
these defendants.' 0' By seating one jury to hear the evidence against each defendant, a
99. Justice Douglas's proposition was made in the context of unified capital trials in which
juries determined whether to impose life or death in the same discussion in which guilt or
innocence was decided. In such a scheme, in most jurisdictions, the life or death decision was
guided by no standards or limitations. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). If
the jury decided to spare the person-or execute them-because of the color of their eyes, such
an arbitrary basis for such a momentous decision was not illegal and was unreviewable.
Therefore, as to the sentencing decision in a unified proceeding, there was really no "law" about
which to be "lawless." So to say that Douglas's proposal in a unified system allowed jurors to be
seated who would not follow the law would only be true in a very narrow class of jurors-
namely those jurors whose opinions regarding (either for or against) the death penalty affected
their ability to properly decide the guilt/innocence question. Only jurors who either were so in
favor of executing wrongdoers that he or she was willing to vote "guilty" even in the absence of
adequate proof; or was so opposed to the death penalty that he or she would vote "not guilty" in
the face of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could be truly considered "lawless" in a unified
system without sentencing standards. Without a system to prevent these jurors from sitting,
Douglas's plan would in these rare cases seat improper jurors.
100. We agree with the view the Court stated in both Witherspoon and in Witt, that the state
may not remove from service those who merely have scruples against the imposition of the death
penalty or for whom the decision would be a difficult one. In our minds, the position stated in
Witherspoon is the correct one: Only those who make unmistakably clear that they would
invariably refuse to impose the death penalty may be removed for cause.
101. This problem arises most often in the context of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968). In Bruton, the Court concluded that the admission of the inculpatory statement of one
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judge can control problems of admissibility by seating only the jury or juries
considering the guilt of a defendant against whom a particular piece of evidence is
admissible. Such. systems have been approved in various states and the federal
system. 102
The principal advantage of such a system, of course, is that a non-death-qualified
jury decides the question of guilt or innocence. As we have discussed, such a jury
would be more impartial on the question of guilt than one that has been death-qualified.
Another advantage is that the jury that determines the appropriate penalty will have
heard all of the testimony at trial. By contrast, both the Massachusetts Council's
approach to bifurcation and our suggested modification of it would permit a defendant
to be sentenced by a jury who had not heard the guilt case, requiring duplication of
proof at the penalty phase. Of course, allowing a single jury to hear all of the evidence
at both phases of a capital case inhibits a defendant's capacity to contest the
government's proof at both stages. The two-jury solution, therefore, is also very much
a compromise.
3. A Single Hybrid Jury
A final alternative to our proposed modification of the Massachusetts approach is
the impaneling of a jury consisting of both death-qualified and non-death-qualified
jurors to determine guilt. Prior to trial, the jurors could be questioned as they currently
are under Witt with regard to their views on the death penalty; however; no juror could
be removed for cause from the guilt-phase on the basis of their answers. Instead, ajury
would be impaneled with both death-qualified and Witt-excludable jurors. This would
lead to a hybrid jury of between 12 (if none of the first dozen jurors were Witt-
excludable) and 24 members (if all of the first twelve jurors were Witt-excludable).
The first twelve members of this hybrid jury would then consider the defendant's
guilt, with the remaining members available as alternates. In the event that such a jury
convicts the defendant of a capital crime, the non-death-qualified jurors would be
excused and only the death-qualified jurors would be allowed to consider the
appropriate sentence. The non-death-qualified jurors-who would have been identified
during voir dire--could be removed from the jury and the court could proceed directly
to the penalty phase without interruption of the proceedings. 103
The use of a hybrid jury would be an improvement over current practice from the
defendant's point of view and an improvement on the Council's recommendation from
the point of view of the state. For the capital defendant, the hybrid jury would permit
him to be judged by ajury that has not been death-qualified, thus greatly increasing the
chances of his acquittal or of his conviction on a non-capital charge. From the state's
point of view, the hybrid jury has the advantage of a single voir dire; however such a
defendant against another defendant could not be cured by a limiting instruction. Id. at 126.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding that a trial
judge acted within his discretion by impaneling two juries to avoid the problems of Bruton v.
United States); People v. Ricardo B., 538 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989) (same); People v. Wardlow, 118
Cal. App. 3d 375 (1981) (same); People v. Church, 429 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. App. 1981) (reaching
the same conclusion despite the fact that the court concluded that the procedure was not
authorized by state law).
103. The effect of such a proceeding on jury-juror dynamics is purely a matter of speculation.
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voir dire will be incrementally more intensive (because more jurors would be needed
than are currently used in the typical capital case).
The primary problem with such a system, however, is that it fails to remedy the
current conundrum in capital cases of the single jury evaluating both the defendant's
guilt-phase defense and his penalty-phase arguments. Under the current system, a
defendant will generally have to choose which of his claims to focus upon, aware that
the assertion of inconsistent arguments is likely to doom him in the jury's eyes.
1°4
While the absence of a death-qualified jury on the question of guilt would be an
improvement, the lack of true bifurcation keeps the hybrid jury from being a panacea.
4. The Modified Massachusetts Solution
We remain convinced that the proposal we outlined above-a modification of the
Massachusetts proposal to allow a defendant to elect before trial or after conviction of
a capital crime to proceed with two separate juries-is the most trustworthy means of
conducting a capital trial. It allows a defendant to truly determine where his case is
strongest and to make that case to the jury in a way that best puts the prosecution to its
proof. For example, some defendants may understand that the government's capital
murder case against them is strong and that their greatest opportunity to save their lives
is to build a case in mitigation. Such defendants might decline to make a pretrial
election of a separate sentencing jury, in the hope of using the guilt phase of the trial to
establish the basis of a case in mitigation before the same jury that will determine their
death-worthiness. If the guilt-phase mitigation case does not appear to be going well or
if the guilt-phase jury seems particularly unsympathetic, however, such defendants
would retain the right to elect a separate sentencing jury upon conviction of capital
murder.
By contrast, some defendants will have a much stronger case on the question of guilt
of capital murder. As strong as that case might be, however, making it before a death-
qualified jury greatly weakens the chances for its success. Thus, under our approach,
such defendants would quite logically make a pretrial election to impanel a second jury
to determine punishment, and thus proceed to trial on the question of guilt or innocence
before a non-death-qualified jury. The only thing they would lose thereby would be the
opportunity to make their mitigation case over a longer period of time or to plead
residual doubts during the penalty phase. In most capital cases this would be a very
wise strategic decision indeed.
Furthermore, our proposal has some efficiency arguments that the current
Massachusetts proposal does not. Under the current Massachusetts proposal, since the
guilt phase jury in every case might end up determining the question of punishment (if
the defendant elects to keep them after they convict him of capital murder), that first
jury must in every case be death-qualified. Only if the defendant ultimately decides to
104. There is also the question of how jurors will react to some of their number being
dismissed prior to the commencement of the penalty phase. An instruction could no doubt be
written to inform the jurors to read nothing into this removal and to continue to base their
conclusions on the evidence and the applicable law. Whether such an instruction would be able
to keep the remaining jurors from speculating as to the reasons for their inclusion and others'
exclusion, however, would be an open, empirical one.
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proceed with the same jury for sentencing will the extra expense of death qualifying
two juries be avoided.
Under our proposal, by contrast, in at least some cases there will be no need to
death qualify the first jury at all, because the defendant will have committed to using
two separate juries prior to trial. Because some of these cases would have resulted in
two death qualified juries under the Massachusetts proposal-had the defendant
deferred his decision to request a separate sentencing jury until after conviction-our
proposal may have the benefit of increasing both the fairness and efficiency of the
capital trial.
CONCLUSION
While we are both strong opponents of the death penalty, we agree that current
capital jury selection is governed by the holdings in the Witherspoon/Witt line of
cases. 105 Generally speaking, both defendants and the state should have the opportunity
to impanel a capital jury that will follow the duly enacted laws that the jury must apply.
Where we part company with the Court is at its decision in Lockhart v. McCree that the
state's interest in efficiency trumps the defendant's interest in fairness and permits a
death qualified jury to decide questions of guilt or innocence.
In this essay we argue that the best way around the conundrum of McCree is to
permit a defendant to decide, prior to his capital trial, that he will be judged by
separate juries for guilt and sentencing. The procedure we outline allows a defendantto
avoid being tried on the question of guilt or innocence by a jury predisposed to convict
him. Because such increases in fairness come at a relatively moderate cost, we argue,
they ought to be incorporated into any statute aimed at instituting best practices for the
just administration of the death penalty.
105. We disagree, of course, with the weakening of the standard of proof and the removal of
federal oversight that the Court authorized via its Witt opinion.
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